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Research in psychopathology may be considered as an intersubjective endeavor mainly
concerned with understanding other minds. Thus, the way we conceive of social
understanding influences how we do research in psychology in the first place. In this paper,
we focus on psychopathology research as a paradigmatic case for this methodological
issue, since the relation between the researcher and the object of study is characterized
by a major component of “otherness.” We critically review different methodologies in
psychopathology research, highlighting their relation to different social cognition theories
(the third-, first-, and second-person approaches). Hence we outline the methodological
implications arising from each theoretical stance. Firstly, we critically discuss the
dominant paradigm in psychopathology research, based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and on quantitative
methodology, as an example of a third-person methodology. Secondly, we contrast
this mainstream view with phenomenological psychopathology which—by rejecting the
reductionist view exclusively focused on behavioral symptoms—takes consciousness as
its main object of study: it therefore attempts to grasp patients’ first-person experience.
But how can we speak about a first-person perspective in psychopathology if the
problem at stake is the experience of the other? How is it possible to understand the
experience from “within,” if the person who is having this experience is another? By
addressing these issues, we critically explore the feasibility and usefulness of a second-
person methodology in psychopathology research. Notwithstanding the importance of
methodological pluralism, we argue that a second-person perspective should inform
the epistemology and methods of research in psychopathology, as it recognizes the
fundamental circular and intersubjective construction of knowledge.
Keywords: intersubjectivity, social understanding, psychopathology research, methodology, second-person
perspective
INTRODUCTION
Psychology, as a discipline, is mainly concerned with knowing
others’ minds1. The problem of social cognition is therefore cru-
cial to any psychological research enterprise, and the way we con-
ceive social understanding influences the way we do research in
psychology (Reddy, 2008). Questions regarding the possibility of
understanding other persons, the way social understanding works
and the influencing factors that play a role in this process are
tightly related to epistemological and methodological issues such
1Mind is here not conceived in the narrow sense of a computational mind
or brain but rather, in a broader sense, as the subject matter of cognitive
science. Similarly, we refer here to social understanding as an epistemological
“problem,” not in the narrow sense of a gap between persons that needs to
be filled; irrespective of the theoretical framework we embrace, understanding
others remains a complex phenomenon that needs to be better understood
and therefore, in this broader sense, it does remain a dilemma.
as: the validity of our claims in doing psychology research; the
development of a proper methodology to understand our object
of study; and the way we should frame and interpret our results
according to the context in which they arise. These questions take
a particular turn in the field of psychopathology research, where
we do not only deal with other minds, but with minds especially
experienced and constructed as different2, because of their distress
and not-ordinary experience.
Psychopathology is a controversial field of research character-
ized by often very polarized views. Mainstream studies focus on
“mental disorders,” considered as inherent to individual “minds”
2Different is here understood not in an ontological or moral sense but simply
in a phenomenological sense: we perceive and experience others as different,
especially in the case of what we categorize as psychopathology. Making
sense, defining, or deconstructing this difference is the very starting point of
psychopathology research.
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(brains) suffering from psychological distress or impairment (or
even biochemical or genetic deficits). At the opposite edge of
this continuum, other approaches try to describe and understand
the contextualized and embodied meaning of the distress (as
for instance, phenomenological psychopathology) and look for
its socio-relational and interpersonal features, origins, and func-
tions3; or the most radical positions (as for instance, anti/critical
psychiatry and many systemic theorists) may even deny the exis-
tence of such a phenomenon as individual psychopathology in
favor of a more social and relational understanding of distress4.
Either way, psychopathology research has to deal with making
sense of the experience of otherness, difference, and alterity,
even when the aim is to deconstruct what is considered to be
a labeling process. Before defining, classifying or constructing
etiological theories, psychopathology research therefore needs
to deal with the primary task of understanding others, but
even more different others. The core methodological issue at
stake here is therefore: how can we understand others, in their
difference? To explore this question, it seems logical to bring
together theories of social understanding with approaches to
psychopathology research and this is what we do in the present
paper.
Since decades the problem of social understanding has been
at the core of the contemporary debate in the cognitive sciences.
Different theories and frameworks have been proposed to account
for this phenomenon and still the debate remains controversial
(see, for instance, Gallagher, 2012; Dullstein, 2012). These the-
ories look at how we understand others from three different
perspectives: a third-person perspective (Theory-Theory), a first-
person perspective (Simulation-Theory), and a second-person
perspective (e.g., Interaction Theory, IT). We critically review
these perspectives on social cognition, highlighting and discussing
their core claims. Though, it is important to stress that our aim is
not to offer an additional contribution to the debate, but rather to
take this very debate as a starting point for some methodological
reflections relevant for psychology and the cognate disciplines.
In particular, we look at the kinds of encounters that take place
in the context of psychopathology research as a paradigmatic
case of the methodological issue at stake; because here, as above
mentioned, the relation between the researcher and the object
of study is characterized by a major component of “otherness.”
Then, we highlight a number of methodological implications for
psychopathology research that necessarily arise from our critical
discussion of approaches to social cognition.
3The idea that psychopathology can be assimilated to a “science of meaning”
was originally formulated by Guidano (1991, p. 59) and is at the core of
Ugazio’s (1998, 2012/2013) socio-constructionist model. This model lays the
foundations for a systemic theory of personality development that explains the
transition from “normalcy” to psychopathology by the reciprocal positioning
that the individual and the persons meaningful to him/her take within the
critical meaning.
4According to these more critical stances, psychopathology is a stigmatizing
label used to categorize, reify and medicalize the diversity and alterity of the
other with the main outcome of pathologizing, alienating, and segregating
them (see, for example—among the many—the criticisms put forward by
classic authors such as Goffman, Laing, Foucault, Szasz, and more recently,
Newnes, Parker, Timimi).
Although we generally acknowledge the need for methodolog-
ical pluralism and we do not see these perspectives as mutually
exclusive, we adopt a rather critical stance: in what follows, we
will outline some shortcomings of the third- and first-person
perspectives. If these shortcomings hold for a general theory
of social understanding, then they should be relevant for those
methodological issues in psychopathology research as well. Dixon
(in Stanghellini, 2007) identified a dilemma inherent in the sci-
ence of the mind, “Is the science of the mind in fact to be a
science of the mind, or a science of something else, such as the
brain or behaviour? Is it to be ‘science by analogy’ or ‘physical
science proper’?” (p. 69). The same question may be posed for
a “science of suffering minds/souls” (from the Greek etymology
of the word “psychopathology”). In exploring these questions, we
will therefore point to a second person alternative as a promising
(although not unproblematic) methodology of psychopathol-
ogy research. Following Stanghellini’s (2007) answer to Dixon’s
question:
The phenomenological perspective, and specially the second-
person mode, advocates that the context of the clinical encounter5
should be one of co-presence (and not of dominance) with the
aim of understanding (and not labelling), i.e. negotiating inter-
subjective constructs, and looking for meaningfulness through the
bridging of two different horizons of meanings. (p. 70)
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING AND METHODOLOGY IN
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: FROM A THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
TO A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
THE THIRD-PERSON APPROACH OF MAINSTREAM
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY RESEARCH
Research in psychopathology mainly focuses on understanding
the causes, correlates, and consequences of psychological dis-
orders. It is commonly based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013) and its diagnostic categories, consisting mainly in lists
of symptoms. Despite its claim of a-theoreticity (since its third
edition), the DSM diagnostic system—and therefore mainstream
research in psychopathology—relies on an epistemology of logical
empiricism and on physicalist ontology (Schwartz and Wiggins,
1986; Parnas and Bovet, 1995; Parnas et al., 2013; Parnas and
Gallagher, in press). Symptoms and mental states are reified and
seen as ontologically independent atomic entities, as material
thing-like objects. Psychological reality is constructed “out there,”
independent of any human perspective, as if it could be known
objectively through empirical observation (e.g., medical test) and
logical thinking by an “external objective expert” (Parnas and
Bovet, 1995; Parnas et al., 2013). By a deceptive mistake that
Husserl (1970) would call “naive objectivism” of the life sciences
[or, a “game of semantics” in Timimi (2013) words], symptoms
5Despite the fact that clinical and research encounters are two different joint
hermeneutic endeavors and thus have many different characteristics and
features, they also share many epistemological and methodological aspects
and dilemmas (e.g., power and knowledge gap, reciprocal positioning), espe-
cially if we consider more recent collaborative–participative research designs
employing in-depth qualitative and creative interview methods.
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become much more than descriptive constructions: they are
reified providing the illusion that the disorder itself exists as a
natural object. This easily leads to etiological theories that link
mental distress to supposed biochemical or genetic causes (and
therefore, mostly pharmaceutical interventions). In this approach
to diagnosis, individuals are equated to their diagnostic label
and therefore stigmatized or even alienated and dehumanized.
To borrow Simblett’s (2013) words, it is possible “to understand
DSM as a textual codification of power/knowledge that creates
a version of reality, individuality and what is known about the
nature of mental illness. But only one possible version” (p. 116).
Despite attempts to unpack and deconstruct this discourse, revi-
sions to DSM are concerned almost exclusively with its criteria
and thresholds. This also shapes and limits the field of possible
research in psychopathology: only approaches constrained within
the boundaries of mainstream research are viable, therefore rein-
forcing its power and the knowledge imbalance in the research
encounter (Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014).
With some notable exceptions of systemic, psychodynamic,
constructivist, and phenomenological authors, psychopathology
research is mainly based on quantitative methods: symptoms,
mental states, performances, personality traits, or neurological
features (etc.) are operationalized as measurable variables to be
statistically correlated with specific diagnoses (Sher and Trull,
1996). The source of diagnostic data are mainly structured inter-
views (or even self-reports) which limit the person’s freedom of
expression by severely restricting their possible responses. They
are based on the same epistemology: de-contextualizing and
fragmenting the other’s experience into a list of internal mental
states and external behaviors that may be counted as present
or absent or rated by their intensity/severity. This in order to
fit these behaviors and mental states into the rigid and pre-
packed diagnostic classification, which is then as well treated
as a variable for research purposes. The attention is mainly on
the verbal and cognitive level, the experience is dis-embodied
and de-contextualized rather than socially situated (Cromby,
2012).
If we look at this research paradigm from the view of cognitive
science we may notice many parallels with the Theory of Mind
theory (TT) of social understanding also referred to as a third-
person approach. The TT is based on the following main assump-
tions: others’ mental states6 are hidden, we do not have direct
access to them (mind–mind gap or “inner world hypothesis”),
and we therefore need some extra cognitive processes in order
to infer the mental state of the other (mentalizing supposition)7.
In inferring and theorizing about other minds we need to refer
to common sense, i.e., folk psychological theories about how
mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) inform the behaviors
of others (Malle, 2004). Observation becomes the evidence for
theorizing and this constitutes our everyday stance toward others
6In the TT approach, minds and mental states are considered in a “software–
hardware” relation to the body (Thompson, 2007); cognitive processes there-
fore happen within Cartesian minds, conceived as radically separated from the
body (body–mind dualism) and from other minds (Western individualism).
7According to TT, these mentalizing processes constitute our primary and
pervasive way of understanding others (supposition of universality).
(spectatorial supposition): we always observe others’ behavior
with some degree of detachment, trying to infer their mental
states from a third personal stance (Gallagher, 2001).
If we now look back at the mainstream methodology in psy-
chopathology research we may notice similar assumptions at the
basis of this paradigm. Variables such as symptoms, behaviors,
performances are considered as an objective reality that can be
observed by a detached researcher (expert); the mental states
of other persons are often inferred from behavioral cues or
even neurological features according to already existing theories.
Therefore, this kind of approach may commit several errors
and take recourse to biases, as widely illustrated by decades of
attributional research.
The experience of the other person is usually directly accessed
(or “assessed”) by the expert position through structured inter-
views, where the researcher is considered as detached from the
patient and his task is to infer the patient’s state of mind, which
is assumed as objective and a-contextual. A paradox seems to be
entailed in this approach, as Reddy (2008) pointed out in her
criticism of TT: if, on one hand, we adopt an empiricist view—
where the only way to know things is through experience given to
our senses—and, on the other hand, we claim that other minds
are not accessible to our experience but rather hidden behind
behaviors (mind–mind gap), knowing other minds results in a
logical impossibility. Similarly, how can we claim to adopt an
empiricist methodology if the object of study (patient’s mental
states) needs to be inferred?
REDISCOVERING SUBJECTIVITY AND PATIENTS’ FIRST PERSON
PERSPECTIVE
Parnas et al. (2013) strongly criticize the third-person approach in
psychopathology research starting from a critical discussion of its
subject matter: “The object of psychopathology is the ‘conscious8
psychic event’, and psychopathology involves and requires an
in-depth study of experience and subjectivity” (p. 271). They
stress the importance of focusing on first-person experience and
subjectivity in the study of psychopathology, without denying
the usefulness and necessity of a methodological pluralism. In
fact, although useful for understanding mental phenomena, the
study of neural substrates, behavioral descriptions and task per-
formances always assumes its relevance in relation to the con-
scious level: the researcher’s interest is never in brain events and
behaviors per se but in their relationship with mental phenomena
and experience (Nordgaard et al., 2012). The call for a first-
person approach (Parnas et al., 2013) therefore not only points
to the fact that first-person experience should be the object of
study for psychopathology research—ultimately, the third-person
approach is an attempt to understand others’ experience as well,
even if in a reductionist and fragmented way—the focus is rather
on the nature of this object and on how it can be understood. The
issue at stake is thus primarily ontological and epistemological.
Embracing a phenomenological view, consciousness cannot
be ontologically considered as atomistic in nature because it is
8Here the concept of consciousness is not meant in a psychodynamic sense,
i.e., as opposed to the unconscious, but in a phenomenological sense: see quote
from Parnas et al. (2013) below for a more detailed definition.
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an ever-changing flow of mutually interdependent phenomena.
Consciousness is a Gestalt, a meaningful whole that cannot be
reduced to an aggregate of parts, a sum of “mental objects.”
Symptoms and behaviors are not meaningless entities from which
we can infer hypotheses about mentality and create a-contextual
definitions and quantifications; they always have a meaning9
that derives from the total state of consciousness, embodied
and embedded in the environment. Therefore, as maintained by
Parnas et al. (2013):
It is crucial to understand phenomenal consciousness (subjectiv-
ity) as the overall field, ground, or horizon within which all “man-
ifestation” or “presencing” of the objects of our awareness occurs.
Consciousness, the phenomenal manifestation of thoughts, feel-
ings, and perceptions, is not some kind of complex spatial, 3-
dimensional object but a lived reality, a presence to itself and
the world: “psyche,” writes Jaspers, is “not […] an object (…)
but ‘being in one’s own world,’ the integrating of an inner and
outer world.” Consciousness manifests itself as a “becoming,”
a temporal “streaming” of a unity of intertwined experiences.
(p. 274)
The phenomenological method introduced in psychiatry by
Jaspers and other influential psychiatrists, such as Binswanger,
Minkowski, and Blankenburg (and then expanded toward a more
interpersonal perspective by Laing), represented the primary
instrument for investigating and describing the first-person expe-
rience of patients (Bürgy, 2008). It is therefore often referred to
as a first-person approach, mainly because of the clear shift in
the consideration of the psychiatric object: the focus is on con-
sciousness as a whole, grasped through an in-depth exploration
of patient’s first-person experience (Fuchs, 2010). As Parnas et al.
(2013) maintained, notions such as self, ownership, reality, ratio-
nality, etc. are of core importance for psychopathology research,
therefore rendering it necessary to focus on subjectivity and the
first-person perspective.
Yet, epistemologically, one may wonder what a first-person
approach might mean in a context where the object of study
is actually the experience of the other. As Parnas et al. (2013)
recognized: “(…) A second domain concerns how and to what
extent is a psychiatrist able to access the patient’s mind and
reconstruct his experience” (p. 274). When shifting from the issue
of the object to that of the method, can we still speak of a first-
person perspective? What does it mean then, to have a first person
understanding of other minds? And how should we therefore
conceive a first-person methodology? In what follows, we will
try to clarify this issue and shed some light on terminology by
referring back to the social cognition debate.
A FIRST PERSON METHODOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING OTHERS
The first-person perspective on social understanding in cogni-
tive science has been defended by the Simulation Theory (ST).
Although sharing the same basic assumptions of TT, ST differs
from the latter in the way the gap between two minds is filled.
As for TT, others’ mental states are considered as hidden: we lack
9And also interpersonal functions or purposes, according to a more systemic–
relational perspective.
direct access to them and our everyday stance toward the other is
still an observational one. The problem is therefore still framed in
the same way: how, when observing others, can we figure out their
hidden mental states?
Instead of inferring mental states on the basis of folk psy-
chological theories, ST claims that we need to simulate within
ourselves the mental state of the other, as if we were them, in order
to understand it.
In philosophy, this process has also been called the argument
from analogy: by analogy with our own experience, we infer that
other bodies must also experience the same sort of mental states
that we have.
Although some (e.g., Goldman, 2005) conceive of this process
of simulation as a mentalizing one, other approaches (Implicit
Simulation Theories) maintain that we implicitly attune with
others at much more basic levels. For instance, drawing on the
neurological basis of mirror neurons, some ST proponents claim
that through the implicit recognition of similarity between our
actions, we are immediately able to reproduce the mental state of
the other person when we see the action they perform (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998).
Within the social cognition debate, ST has already been widely
criticized under many aspects. Gallagher (2012), for instance,
pointed out the contradiction in putting the very notion of
simulation at the basis of social understanding:
One can see the starting problem clearly, for example, in Gold-
man’s description of the first step involved in running a sim-
ulation routine. “First, the attributor creates in herself pretend
states intended to match those of the target. In other words, the
attributor attempts to put herself in the target’s ‘mental shoes”’
(Goldman, 2005, p. 80). This first step seems tricky. How do I
know which pretend state (belief or desire) matches what the
other person has in mind. Indeed, isn’t this what simulation is
supposed to deliver? If I already know what state matches the
target, then the problem, as defined by ST, is already solved.
(p. 207)
As we will mention later on, while describing Gallagher’s
own theoretical proposal for social understanding, what he finds
missing in first-person accounts is the recognition of contextual
knowledge and interactive processes as necessary and constitutive
parts of social understanding. Reddy (2008) further argued that
a ST of understanding does not even solve the problem of the
gap between two minds, as it basically relies on an overgeneral-
ization of one case (one’s own experience). Although in ST the
focus is more on experiencing than on theorizing, the experi-
ence on which I base my knowledge of the other can only be
my own: it is still an attribution based upon the self (Reddy,
2008).
The argument from analogy for explaining social understand-
ing is considered controversial in the phenomenological liter-
ature; as we will contend in the next section, since Husserl’s
understanding of empathy as the primary mode of social under-
standing, it is clear that phenomenological theories are rather
coherent with a second personal mode. Although a simulationist
understanding of empathy, as an “as if ” awareness of the other
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person, has been repeatedly rejected in phenomenological theo-
ries, it can still in some cases inform the methodology of phe-
nomenological psychiatry, which is nowadays sometimes referred
to as first personal in this sense (Stanghellini, 2007, 2010; Fuchs,
2010).
For instance, in Jaspers’ (1997) General Psychopathology10 the
process of understanding the patient has often been described
as an “imaginative actualizing” of the other’s experience (Fuchs,
2010; Wiggins and Schwartz, 2013): in order to understand others,
we need to relive (nachleben) in ourselves their experiences. Start-
ing from the assumption that the best evidence of mental life is
self-reflection, the best way to access what cannot be immediately
present to us (others’ experience) is to make it present through
a process of imaginative identification (Wiggins and Schwartz,
1997, 2013). Therefore, by intuitively representing the other’s
psychic states, we can grasp what it is like to be like him/her: a
transpositional movement that actually follows the structure of
analogy (Stanghellini, 2007). This process of empathically putting
oneself in the other’s place in order to understand him/her, pre-
supposes a “bracketing” of one’s own assumptions and prejudices,
in order to get as close as possible to the original experience
of the other. Although we acknowledge the importance of this
methodological step, the epistemological concern related to a
first-person methodology (as for the criticism of a ST of social
cognition) is whether I am projecting my own experiences onto
the other, which may go with the risk of transforming under-
standing into mere speculation (Stanghellini, 2007; Wiggins and
Schwartz, 2013), or determining, rather than understanding, the
other (Reddy, 2008).
This leads us to the exploration of what has been proposed as
an alternative in cognitive science: a second-person perspective.
Before entering into the core of the methodological discussion
on this regard, it is worth looking at how, in the cognitive
sciences, this approach has been defined and constructed through
different contributions. We will do this in the following section
in order to move, in Section “Methodological Implications for
a Second-Person Psychopathology,” to the methodological dis-
cussion, where we draw some methodological implications for
psychopathology research directly from each main claim of the
second-person approach in cognitive science.
A SECOND-PERSON APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING
OTHERS
The second-person approach offers an alternative explanation of
social cognition based on a firm refusal of the body–mind gap
and the mind–mind gap. It is often referred to as Interaction
Theory (Gallagher, 2001), which draws on a phenomenological
understanding of social cognition. Nevertheless, different authors
contributed to defining this perspective, rendering it more elabo-
rate and complex.
10We are aware that the view presented here is just one possible interpretation
of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology. Indeed, our aim here is not to engage in
a critical discussion of Jasper’s work or to identify this particular reading with
phenomenological psychopathology in general, but to present an example of
what a first-person methodology in psychopathology research may mean.
Phenomenological approaches challenge the basic assump-
tions of TT and ST, emphasize the role of the body in the processes
of human understanding, and refuse the Cartesian dualism of
body and mind: the basis for understanding lies already in the
pre-reflective intentional connection between bodies; personal
emotions and intentions are already present in any expressive
behavior, which is therefore considered as meaningful from the
very start (Thompson, 2007; Gallagher, 2001). Coherently with
this perspective, Gallagher (2008b) notion of direct perception
refuses the mind–mind gap (and therefore the mentalizing sup-
position) by claiming that other minds are directly perceivable
in interaction: we can see grief or fear in the expression of
another person without the need to infer or theorize. Perception is
“smart”: when perceiving we already grasp the meaning of things
in relation to us and our possibilities for action and response;
this constitutes the basis of social understanding, which therefore
mostly happens already at the pre-reflective, embodied level (Gal-
lagher, 2008b). As Reddy (2008) reformulates it, emphasizing the
role of emotional engagement, “we see feelingly.”
The idea that we need to develop a Theory of Mind (ToM) in
order to understand others is challenged from a developmental
perspective as well, as early processes of embodied intersubjective
understanding have been shown to be already present during
the first months of infants’ life (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978;
Trevarthen, 1979; Fivaz-Depeursinge and Corboz-Warnery, 1999;
Reddy, 2008) and even in newborns (see Fivaz-Depeursinge and
Philipp, 2014). This evidence stresses the role of emotional and
pre-reflective engagement in social cognition (Reddy and Morris,
2004): the baby’s world is non-verbal. Developmental studies have
clearly shown that infants learn to understand others, not via
mindreading other persons’ independent qualities but through
interactive engagement with them; for instance, the rhythmic
attunement between the mother and the baby during breastfeed-
ing is crucial for developing mind and communication (Kaye,
1982; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001).
Another core assumption of the second personal stance lies
in the refusal of the spectatorial supposition: we understand
others in our everyday interactions with them, in the perception–
action loops in which we are directly involved when interacting
(Gallagher, 2008b). To believe that social cognition is based on
an observational stance where we try to figure out the mental
states of others as detached scientists does not do justice to our
social reality. A second-person approach recognizes the intrinsic
circularity of knowledge as a situated practice: “what we know
of other minds must depend on our engagements with them,
but these engagements must depend on what we know of them”
(Reddy, 2008, pp. 31–32).
The process of social understanding cannot therefore be
resolved by the sole effort of one person but it arises in the
in-between of interaction, it is constituted by social interaction
and shaped by emotional engagement (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2013); moreover,
as it takes two to tango, in order for an interaction to happen,
the autonomy of the two interactors needs to be maintained (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
With the concept of participatory sense-making (PSM) De
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) emphasize the constitutive role of the
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interaction for social understanding, an aspect that has become a
ground for criticizing and integrating Gallagher’s IT11 (De Jaegher
and Froese, 2009; De Jaegher et al., 2010). In Reddy (2008) words:
engagement in the interaction does not only provide information
about minds but creates them. A similar stance is taken by
Ugazio’s (1998, 2012/2013) constructionist approach, where she
claims that conversational processes not only are the context in
which individual identities develop but they are what constitutes
them in the first place.
By stressing the importance of social interaction, it is, however,
necessary to note that a second personal stance is not just a
social constellation, the mere use of the “you,” rather being an
attitude of openness that involves the recognition and acknowl-
edgment of the other as a person; it requires that we directly
address the other as someone that can respond and understand
(Reddy, 2008). Drawing on Buber’s (1937) distinction between I–
Thou relationship (second personal stance) and I–It relationship
(third personal stance), Reddy (2008) notices that, even when
interacting with someone, we may still regard him or her as an
object, an instance of a category; with this stance, we do not take
seriously the ongoing interaction and we actually remain in an
observational, detached position.
As Fuchs (2012) also emphasizes, drawing on phenomenol-
ogists such as Husserl and Scheler, what distinguishes object
perception and the perception of another person lies in a radically
different attitude toward the object. Object perception is an enac-
tive and dynamic process in which we immediately perceive things
according to their affordances, for their predictability and the
possibilities of action they offer to us12 (Gibson, 1979). However,
when we are directed toward other persons, our perception is
not just driven by Gibsonian affordances, we relate to others in
a “personalistic attitude,” which means, we engage and resonate
with them and we are responsive to their behavior, emotions, and
intentions (Fuchs, 2012). Engagement, resonance, and respon-
siveness are therefore core defining aspects of a second-person
perspective.
Importantly, this attitude toward others implies not only the
recognition of similarity (as it is stressed by a first-person, simu-
lationist approach), but also the acknowledgment of difference. In
fact, in order to experience the other as a particular other to whom
we are responsive, we need to recognize his or her difference from
us, otherwise we would simply reduce their experience to our
own (Reddy, 2008). This becomes clear from a phenomenological
point of view (Zahavi, 2010, 2011) when considering the notion
of empathy, which is regarded as constituting the core of pre-
reflective social understanding. Empathy grounds an unmediated
and non-inferential access to others’ experience; still it differs
from the direct experiential access we have to our own mind (the
focus is on the other, not on ourselves or on what it would be like
11As Schilbach et al., 2013 also noted, in fact, Gallagher’s initial notion of direct
perception may still fall into an observer epistemology: knowing other minds
means perceiving them.
12Indeed Gallagher (2008b) maintained that perception is “smart” even when
directed to material things: “I do not see red mass, shape, and color, and then
try to piece all of that together to make it up to my car. I simply and directly
see my car. (…) I see the car not just as some object among others, but as an
object that I can use—that I can climb into and drive.” (pp. 356–357)
to be in the other’s place). The notion of empathy, as it is under-
stood in phenomenology, is truly second personal: we encounter
others as embodied subjects, we are able to empathically grasp
their experience, and still, the experience we make of them is
different from their original experience (Zahavi, 2010)13. Indeed,
as noted by Murray and Holmes (2014):
Husserl (1989: 170–180) characterizes intersubjectivity as
Einfühlung—empathy—and Heidegger (1962: 153–163) writes
of an ontological or prepredicative Mit-sein—‘being-with’
others—a hyphenated formulation that points to the prereflective
experiential inseparability of these terms. “He [sic] who speaks
enters into a system of relations which presuppose his presence
and at the same time make him open and vulnerable” (Merleau-
Ponty 1973: 17). (p. 13)
The different contributions to a second-person approach
mainly focus on the pre-reflective, implicit level of experience,
on the way we intuitively grasp the others’ state of mind by
engaging with them in here and now encounters. Refusing TT
and ST suppositions of universality, the second-person approach
therefore maintains that social understanding happens primarily
at the embodied, pre-reflective level of experience; as Fuchs and
De Jaegher (2009) called it, it is based on a dynamic process of
“mutual incorporation.”
In this regards, Dullstein (2012) critically pointed out that the
second-person approach, by emphasizing the role of pre-reflective
processes of understanding, may not yet provide an answer to the
problem of how we actually understand others’ mental states. In
her comment on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s theory, she questions the
extent to which these theories explain the phenomenon of social
understanding, as it is conceived in the cognitive science debate.
As she stated for Reddy’s account:
The phenomena Reddy points to are well-known and hard to deny.
Emotions do shape the way we experience each other. But the
question is as to whether these phenomena help us to give new
answers to the questions which the ToM debate is about: Do they
allow us to acquire knowledge about the other’s feelings or beliefs?
(p. 236)
Similarly, she criticizes Gallagher for confusing two different
notions of understanding: namely, understanding others in terms
of their mental states and understanding as basically engaging or
interacting. Although engagement and interaction are important
and constitutive for social understanding, they cannot be con-
fused with it; contrary to what Gallagher (2008b) claimed, social
cognition is not the same as social interaction (Dullstein, 2012).
These questions are particularly relevant for the issue at
stake in this paper; in fact, although (as we shall later argue)
the interaction and engagement with research participants is of
core importance for a methodological reflection, the research
enterprise in psychopathology aims at understanding patients’
meanings, beliefs, motives, and not just at empathically grasping
them.
13Upholding the recognition of an irreducible otherness, the concept of
empathy cannot be clashed with a first person, simulationist approach. For
a more detailed discussion on the topic, see Jardine, J. (forthcoming).
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As Zahavi (2010) clearly outlines, drawing on Schutz’s insights:
Although on Schutz’s view it is permissible to say that certain
aspects of the other’s consciousness, such as his joy, sorrow, pain,
shame, pleading, love, rage and threats, are given to us directly
and non-inferentially, he denies that it should follow from the
fact that we can intuit these surface attitudes that we also have a
direct access to the why of such feelings. But when we speak of
understanding (the psychological life of) others, what we mean
is precisely that we understand what others are up to, why they
are doing what they are doing, and what that means to them. To
put it differently, interpersonal understanding crucially involves an
understanding of the actions of others, of their whys, meanings
and motives. And in order to uncover these aspects, it is not
sufficient simply to observe expressive movements and actions, we
also have to rely on interpretation, we also have to draw on a highly
structured context of meaning (Zahavi, 2010, p. 297).
By emphasizing the role of pre-reflective understanding, in
which we can transparently grasp intentions and emotions of oth-
ers, most exponents of the second-person approach (Gallagher,
2008b; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009; Fuchs, 2012) see this inter-
subjective endeavor as mostly unambiguous: “in our everyday
engagements we do not constantly go around trying to solve
puzzles” (Gallagher, 2008a, p. 169). However, they do not deny
that behavior may actually become ambiguous in many situations
and in these cases, since we cannot rely on primary embodied
understanding, we need to start reflecting on the other’s mental
states, motives, and intentions. This is the place where TT and
ST still play a role in understanding: we may in fact need to
assume a more detached stance toward others and try to infer
or simulate their mental states in order to understand them
(Gallagher, 2008a,b; Fuchs, 2012).
Ratcliffe (2006) argued against the need to go back to a first- or
third-person perspective in order to explain higher level processes
of understanding: “all instances of interpersonal understanding
are interactive. A wholly detached, theoretical I-he/she/it stance
is something that is never adopted towards persons. Even third
person stances are interactive and should not be identified with
the impersonal stance of scientific enquiry” (p. 42; see also Di
Paolo and and De Jaegher, 2012). Taking seriously the constitutive
role of the interaction process, which is one of the core assump-
tions of the second-person approach, Ratcliffe (2006) denies that
even more reflective processes of understanding may be seen as a
person attributing mental states or unidirectionally interpreting
another person: “B is not just interpreted by A but is also con-
stitutive of the process through which A interprets A, B and the
relationship between them” (p. 40)14. Therefore, social cognition
should be rather seen as a collaborative enterprise of mutual
understanding about the persons involved, their beliefs, their
experiences, and emotions (Dullstein, 2012). This process could
be described, at the linguistic conversational level, as Gadamer’s
14Ratcliffe’s claim touches upon the core underpinning of social
constructionism—although phenomenology differs from social
constructionism in its ontological and epistemological claims—that is,
the role of conversational processes as constitutive for social understanding;
these claims are therefore also tightly linked to ideas of circular causality as
put forward by cybernetics and systemic thinking.
(2004) hermeneutic circle: a mutual agreement, co-constructed
in the interaction, on an object, which in this case is one of
the persons involved. Similarly, at the implicit level, the same
process may be understood, with Waldenfels (1979) as a mutual
tuning of the two partners involved, as it happens, for example, in
caregiver–infant proto-conversations (Dullstein, 2012).
As it is clear in Zahavi’s (2010) words, for understanding others
we rely not only on pre-reflective processes of perception in the
here and now encounter but also on interpretation and on “highly
structured contexts of meaning” (p. 297). Social understanding
and meaning-making do not happen in a vacuum: according
to the British anthropologist and cyberneticist Bateson (1979),
“without context, words and actions have no meaning at all” (p.
15). Therefore, depending on the context we are in, our behaviors,
beliefs, and the meaning we attribute to our own and other
people’s experiences and relationships may vary; and thus we may
position ourselves and be positioned by others in different ways.
Cronen et al. (1982) in the Coordinated Management of Meaning
theory (CMM) showed how, in the context of the here and now
situation, different levels of meaning intertwine and coordinate
in a mutual interaction with others: starting from the episode and
going up to the personal history, the history of the relationship
and the cultural framework. All these aspects play a constitutive
role in social understanding and come into play in every social
encounter.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A SECOND-PERSON
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
If we adopt a second-person perspective in understanding social
cognition, what are the implications for the particular kind of
interaction that is the focus of this paper, namely the rela-
tion between a researcher and a person presenting with a psy-
chopathology? How may the insights coming from the social
cognition debate enlighten the methodological process of research
in psychopathology?
If we start from the last (and strongest) claim by Ratcliffe
(2006), that any kind of interpersonal understanding is always
constituted and influenced by the interaction in which it arises,
we may first start to see that the research process is not as linear
as it would seem. There is no epistemic subject (the researcher)
gathering information about an epistemic object (the patient),
but a dynamic process of sense-making in which both partici-
pants, as well as the interaction and its context (or setting), have a
constitutive (although different) role. Interpersonal understand-
ing conceived as a collaborative enterprise points to the active
role of research participants in the constitution of knowledge and
to the relational nature of the elicited data; even in experimental
studies in psychology, participants’ behavior is always an answer
to a question posed by the researcher (Rommetveit, 2003). Indeed,
especially in psychopathology research, one needs to acknowl-
edge that patients are not passive objects to be analyzed but,
according to a second-person approach, they always contribute
to the process of understanding. As Rommetveit (2003) puts it:
“Coauthorship of psychological theory on the part of the human
informant is an epistemologically unique and distinctive feature
of the psychology of the second person as a communicative genre”
(p. 212).
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These considerations necessarily raise the issue of validity
in psychopathology research: are our descriptions and theories
actually about what we claim to be the object of our research
(i.e., the patient’s experience)? If, as Rommetveit (2003) claims,
psychology is a communicative genre, the data we elicit always
contain information not only about the other, but also about
ourselves. Moreover, drawing on Reddy (2008) account, we may
push this argument even beyond the level of communication into
the very pre-reflective process of perception:
Our perceptual experience of another person’s frown or smile
or tears, therefore, must always include in it our proprioceptive
experience of our own bodily state and, most importantly, our
affective and motivational state. Conversely, our proprioceptive
experience of our own acts and reactions and feelings always
involves the perception of what relevant others are doing, saying or
feeling. As the psychologist John Shotter put it, there is a constant
intertwining and intermingling of the two (p. 30).
Although Reddy (2008) argues that within active emotional
engagement this link between proprioceptive experience (of the
self and of self-feelings-for-the other) and perceptive experience
(of other-feelings-for-the-self) is much tighter than in uninvolved
observation, she also reckons that this intertwinement still hap-
pens even in more disengaged stances. Methodologically, it is
therefore necessary to acknowledge this link and, for the sake of
validity, it is important to find ways to disentangle it.
In contrast to quantitative research methods that postulate the
neutral observational position of the researcher, qualitative meth-
ods in psychology (and therefore in psychopathology research)
acknowledge reflexivity: that is, the researcher, in gathering the
data and producing the analysis, is always a constitutive and
influencing part of the research process (Dallos and Vetere, 2005;
Lyons and Coyle, 2007). This is a core methodological concern in
qualitative research that is dealt with through different strategies:
going from, as it is common for all qualitative methods, an
explicit consideration of the researcher “speaking position” (i.e.,
the epistemological framework); up to finer techniques that allow
a thoughtful inclusion of the researcher’s feelings, impressions
and assumptions in the analysis process (as it is common to,
e.g., Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, Grounded The-
ory, or Narrative Analysis); and finally in actual cooperative (or
co-authoring) research designs where the participant becomes
actively involved in the process of validity check, for example,
through respondent validation (Dallos and Vetere, 2005; Lyons
and Coyle, 2007)15.
We consider the use of reflective practice, in its different forms
and techniques, a very important methodological step for the
research process. Reflecting on one’s own theoretical assump-
tions and research questions but also on one’s own personal
15Importantly, as Davidson (2003) noticed, in psychopathology research, to
include the patient as a partner in the research enterprise does not mean
to consider him/her as a fellow scientist: “the role of the participant in our
research is not to be a fellow psychologist but to be precisely what she or
he is: (e.g.) a person experiencing life with schizophrenia.” Cooperation with
research participants is indeed based on the recognition of differences and of
different roles.
motivation and personal history is a way of acknowledging the
very intersubjective aspect of the research endeavor which does
include the researcher as a constitutive part of it. Di Maggio et al.
(2008) have interestingly maintained that autobiographical mem-
ory plays an important role in understanding others (especially
with dissimilar others) and they therefore suggested that self-
reflection may enhance the possibility and accurateness of social
understanding16.
Another methodological implication of a second-person per-
spective, which again seems to be coherent with qualitative
research methods, has to do with idiography. As already briefly
mentioned in the previous section, Reddy (2008) highlighted the
importance of acknowledging the other for his or her difference,
avoiding reducing the other to a category or to his/her similarity
to ourselves. From a second-person perspective, we see the other
as a particular other:
A second person perspective pluralizes the other: there is no such
‘the other’ but different others depending of different degree and
type of engagements. Engagement in the second person allows us
to experience others within our emotional responses to them as
particular others—an experiencing which is more than simply a
recognition of their similarity to ourselves. (p. 27)
Similarly, idiography is concerned with the particular person:
in contrast to nomothetic approaches, which are rather concerned
with making claims at the population level and demonstrating
general rules, idiographic approaches value the in-depth and
detailed analysis of particular cases. There is no general “other,”
that may be equated to an average or a category, but single persons
and single encounters to be understood in their own right. It
is not the case that idiography eschews generalization, only, the
strategies for generalizing are different and the methodological
focus is on validity rather than on reliability (Smith et al., 2009). A
focus on in-depth analysis of single cases has also been stressed by
phenomenology: “It is not so much the number of cases seen that
matters in phenomenology but the extent of the inner exploration
of the individual case, which needs to be carried to the furthest
possible limit” (Parnas et al., 2013, p. 273). In this case, general-
ization is not based on statistical average but on the typicality of
a case (a prototype). In fact, the most illuminating cases are often
not the most common ones (statistically speaking) but rather
the exceptional ones; in this sense, the generalization from these
cases qualitatively provides an expansion of understanding on the
studied phenomenon (Parnas et al., 2013).
As we have seen, the recognition and acknowledgment of the
other person in his or her difference and uniqueness, the active
role of the other person in the process of interaction and the
constitutive influence of the very interaction process for social
understanding are core claims of a second-person perspective that
have important methodological implications. Though, a second-
person approach not only makes us aware that the knowledge
16We do not agree with the simulationist approach proposed by Di Maggio
et al. (2008) and with the emphasis they put on processes of mentalizing and
mindreading. Yet, we believe that some of the insights proposed in their paper
may be interesting even if looked at from a different theoretical framework
and if applied to methodological issues.
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about the epistemic object comes from our relationship with it but
also that this relationship is mainly played out at the embodied
level of engagement and empathy, which constitutes the core of
social understanding. As we have outlined, phenomenological
approaches contributed to the social cognition debate by high-
lighting the role of direct, pre-reflective processes of understand-
ing that take place in the actual encounter between embodied
subjects.
Coherently, within the tradition of phenomenological psy-
chiatry this emphasis on pre-reflective engagement and on the
importance of empathy for understanding others emerged in
techniques like “the feeling diagnosis,” where the clinician’s emo-
tional reaction to the patient was considered a way to understand
psychopathology (Reddy, 2008).
The relevance of the embodied here and now situation of the
clinical interview has also been stressed by the more recent phe-
nomenological approach of Parnas et al. (2013). They contrasted
a phenomenological method of interviewing with standard struc-
tured assessments, underlying how the interaction between the
interviewer and the patients should be structured as a mutually
interactive reflection: a dialogical I–Thou situation where the
interpersonal rapport is crucial for eliciting the patient’s expe-
rience in its full complexity and for understanding meaningful
connections (Nordgaard et al., 2012). This stance is first of all
based on a “phenomenological reduction”:
What a phenomenological interviewer attempts to do is to suspend
the standard presuppositions of the shared, commonsense world,
the unquestioned, commonsense background with its assump-
tions about time, space, causality, and self-identity, and about
what does and does not exist as “real.” (Nordgaard et al., 2012,
p. 360).
This first step allows the interviewer to be open toward the
other and engage in a truly second personal and dialogical pro-
cess of exploration, rather than monologically lead the interview
according to predefined assumptions.
Notwithstanding the importance of this methodological shift,
a second-person method cannot be limited to the here and now
encounter between two embodied subjects. The intersubjective
endeavor of the research process in fact does not end with inter-
viewing but goes on through the whole process of analysis and a
thorough methodological reflection on this process seems to be
missing in contemporary phenomenological psychiatry.
As Dullstein (2012) noticed, the pre-reflective engagement, the
acknowledgment of the other person in a truly second personal
stance does not yet answer the question of how we understand
the other person’s beliefs, intentions, and motives. Similarly, even
if a phenomenological interview allows a much more detailed
and coherent description of the other’s first-person experience,
the question of how to understand these data still remains unan-
swered. In the here and now moment of encounter with the
patient, the researcher, by bracketing his own assumptions, allows
the opening of a space where the other’s experience can be freely
elicited in its full complexity and, by taking an I–Thou stance
in the interaction, he can have an implicit direct grasp of the
patient’s experience. But how can we understand what we cannot
immediately empathically grasp in the interaction? How can we
make sense of the ambiguous or bizarre behaviors17 (which often
lead the diagnosis of a psychopathology) that do not actually
appear to be meaningful to most of us?
As mentioned above, in cognitive science, the problem of
how to understand the other in ambiguous situations, when
primary and pre-reflective intersubjective processes of under-
standing are not enough, was often solved through a shift from
an implicit second-person stance to an explicit third or first
personal, reflective stance. The same shift can be often witnessed
in psychopathology research, when moving from the here and
now interview situation to the actual process of data analysis.
For instance, the EASE interview (Parnas et al., 2005), cre-
ated for exploring anomalous self-experience in schizophrenia,
is based on a phenomenological second-person understanding
of the interview process which allows a thorough exploration of
the patient’s experience. Yet, the way this experience is accounted
for in the analysis process seems to fall back into a third-person
approach, since a checklist is used for evaluation. In fact, by using
a checklist, the researcher reads the data (the elicited experience
of patients) according to a “normative” theory, i.e., s/he looks
for and selects the patient’s words that fit into his/her theoret-
ical framework, which is defined a priori. By doing this, the
researcher assumes an independent and neutral third personal
stance. Although the EASE checklist is inspired by a phenomeno-
logical theory of schizophrenia, this does not ensure that the
methodology is truly phenomenological or second personal.
We do not deny the usefulness of checklists and of third-person
approaches in general. Sometimes they constitute a necessary step
for the research process, which should ideally combine different
methods or tools; we believe that methodological pluralism is the
way to go. Nevertheless, when applying a third-person method,
it is important to be aware of its implications and, as highlighted
above, of the problems that come with it. Using a checklist to read
through empirical data may indeed be a useful way to validate a
theory; on the other hand, though, if the authority of the analysis
process remains with the theory (as in the case of third-person
methods) the risk is to fall into a tautological process, where a
theory is built on a reading of empirical data according to the
same theory. In order for a theory to develop further, we believe
that a second-person stance is necessary (at least as a step in
the research process) to re-allocate the authority of the analysis
process to the other’s experience (see the end of this section for a
further elaboration on this point).
Another example of this methodological issue is
Davidson (2003) qualitative phenomenological analysis
of interviews with persons with schizophrenia. As in the
case of Parnas’ studies, Davidson’s interviewing technique is
phenomenological, i.e., based on phenomenological reduction
and on a dialogical second-person stance toward the other. The
process of analysis though, seems to be rather first personal in the
method that is applied for understanding the elicited narratives.
17By this expression we refer to those experiences that in most cultures are
perceived and/or defined as extraneous to common sense understanding, e.g.,
psychotic experiences, hallucinations and delirium, although this is at the core
of an animated debate.
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This process is in fact mainly based on the concept of empathy,
here conceived as an imaginative transposal into the other’s place:
In cultivating empathy for another person’s experiences, we have
found it useful to build imaginative bridges between his or her
experiences and our own. We do this—especially in cases in
which the meaning of the experience is far from obvious—as one
might do in certain acting classes, by recalling experiences in our
own lives that have similarities to the experiences in question
(Davidson, 2003, p. 123).
Although “stepping into the other’s place” is methodologically
very important if we are to get as close as possible to participant’s
original experience, the worry within a first personal method is
still whether this is enough to grasp his/her “otherness,” i.e., the
aspects of his or her experience that I would not grasp even if I
were in his or her shoes, because I am a different person.
As highlighted in the above discussion on third- and first-
person methodology, the Procrustean risk of walking down these
routes is that we either try to fit the patient’s experience into
our own theories (eventually leading to tautology) or reduce it
by analogy to our own experience. Although we acknowledge
the importance and value of both Parnas and Davidson’s work,
with these two examples we wanted to show how, by grounding
the validity of our understanding only on the here and now
engagement with the patient (e.g., in the interview method) we
may fail to account for his/her “otherness,” the aspects of his/her
experience that we may not immediately grasp or empathically
understand.
In order to overcome this methodological problem,
Stanghellini and Rosfort (2013) proposed the notion of “second-
order empathy,” as a valuable alternative that goes beyond both
the phenomenological notion of primary non-conative empathy
and the conative notion of empathy. Non-conative empathy is
the most basic form of empathy: the pre-reflective resonance
between my own and the other’s lived body that allows a direct,
implicit understanding. Conative empathy is a more reflective
and cognitive task that requires more than implicit attunement
at the level of the lived body. Conative empathy is based on
one’s personal past experiences and knowledge of commonly
shared experiences (common sense), and it consists in an active
reflective act of understanding by analogy: “I look inside myself
for stored experiences to make them resonate with those of the
other” (Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2013, p. 342). By contrast,
second-order empathy does not rely on similarity or analogy with
the other, rather being based on the recognition of the other’s
autonomy: “In order to empathize with these persons, I need to
acknowledge the existential difference, the particular autonomy,
which separates me from the way of being in the world that
characterizes each of them” (Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2013, p.
343).
Through the recognition of difference, the process of inter-
personal understanding takes the form of a hermeneutic circle of
negotiation of meaning between two autonomous subjectivities.
Stanghellini (2010) therefore proposed hermeneutics as a frame-
work for understanding psychopathology, which may be coherent
with a second-person stance:
Second-person understanding, which requires an involvement
(engagement) of the researcher (interviewer), but not of the kind
that may obstruct the reliability of results, complements the first-
person approach. It envisions understanding not as the effect of
the empathy or the internal actualization of the other’s experience,
but as an open cycle of questions and answers between inter-
viewer and interviewee. Dialogue, seeking corroboration of the
interviewer’s constructs and the interviewee’s self-understanding,
is the major method of inquiry for structural psychopathology.
(pp. 323–324)
As Blankenburg (1980) stressed, although from a phenomeno-
logical stance the researcher tries to bracket his own assumptions
in order to get as close as possible to the other’s experience (trying
to grasp it in its own autonomy), it is inevitable that one’s own
subjectivity enters in the process of interpretation.
An integration of phenomenology and hermeneutics has
already been recognized as pointing in the direction of a second-
person methodology, although the combination of the two has
been so far rather unsatisfactory; in fact, hermeneutics has
been only considered mainly for its role in interviewing tech-
niques (Stanghellini, 2007, 2010) or in psychotherapeutic praxis
(Fuchs, 2010). Instead, we argue that hermeneutics (together
with phenomenology) should be taken seriously for a method-
ological grounding of the process of understanding at play in
psychopathology research.
Integrating phenomenology and hermeneutics, Smith et al.
(2009; see also Smith, 2004) developed a method of analysis,
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (or IPA), that we pro-
pose here as an example of a second-person methodology that
may be a valuable tool for psychopathology research. Without
going into the technical details of IPA, we consider IPA as a
valid and non-reductive attempt to grasp the other’s experience:
namely, a dynamic understanding that goes from the within
(the patient’s experience) to the between (the researcher and the
patient) and back.
The dual process of understanding in IPA unfolds through
a double hermeneutics, i.e., a circular movement like a dance,
where, on one hand, we (try to) bracket our own prejudices
and we empathically engage with the other, taking on an insider
stance led by a hermeneutics of empathy (Smith et al., 2009);
on the other hand, we use our own impressions, feelings, the-
oretical assumptions, and even critical stance for interpretation
(hermeneutics of questioning). This accords well with what Reddy
(2008) has argued, namely that a second-person methodology
needs to be balanced between engagement and disengagement,
being involved and at a distance, stepping into and out of the
frame to explore it better.
In this dual process, we temporarily try to suspend (or better,
bracket away, in the sense that they are acknowledged and tracked
down, not ignored) our own personal lens to become more
sensitive to the experiences of the other during both interviewing
and analysis. When reading the transcripts, we note different
kinds (descriptive, linguistic, interpretative, and self-reflexive) of
comments at both margins of the text and we make use of a
research journal to track and bracket our thoughts that may be
later integrated in the interpretation. To put it in Smith et al.’s
(2009) terms:
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1150 | 10
Galbusera and Fellin Second-person psychopathology
By focusing on attending closely to your participant’s words, you
are more likely to park or bracket your own pre-existing concerns,
hunches, and theoretical hobby horses. It is not that you should
not be curious and questioning; it is that your questioning at this
phase of the project should all be generated by attentive listening
to what your participant has to say. (p. 64)
The second step of the analysis process is rather interpretative:
we do make sense of the other’s experience from our personal
stance and theoretical framework. However, if we are to avoid
a third-person theorizing stance, interpretation cannot be based
on a hermeneutics of suspicion18 (Smith et al., 2009), where
we understand the other’s experience according to a theoretical
perspective from the outside (an outsider expert stance, as for
instance in psychoanalysis): the authority that should give validity
to our claims is the experience of the other (Smith et al., 2009).
Interpretation is therefore here a reading from within the
participant’s experience19, yet, it emerges out of a continuous
process of interaction between the researcher and the participant
in the situated context, as meaning making does not happen in a
relational void.
Coherently with a second-person perspective, Brown et al.
(2011) contend that IPA provides a valuable alternative to various
research methodologies that fail to account for the lived totality of
individual experience, which is often either fragmentized and bro-
ken into separate components (e.g., cognition, emotion, memory,
personality) or reduced to other analytic frames at broader social
levels (e.g., discourse analysis).
However, this approach also has its limitations. First of all, it
often fails to grasp the embodied level of meaning-making which
lies at the core of any phenomenological encounter: what Brown
and colleagues have called “the methodological problem of body
in psychology” (Brown et al., 2011, p. 496; Cromby, 2012). To
borrow Murray and Holmes’ (2014) words:
And yet our impression of the IPA literature was that the body
itself is often absent, or simply presumed to exist behind straight-
forward descriptions (or spoken testimony) from research partic-
ipants, as if these descriptions straightforwardly conveyed what is
called the lived-experience of the subject, his/her body, and his/her
intersubjective relations with others. (p. 6)
Although a detailed methodological discussion of IPA is out-
side of the scope of this paper, this criticism is worth mentioning
here as it touches upon one of the core aspects of a second-person
approach: the primary embodied and pre-reflective processes that
are always at play in social understanding.
Murray and Holmes (2014) recall Merleau-Ponty’s (1973)
original concepts of the embodied parole parlante (speaking
speech) as opposed to parole parlée (spoken speech). Whereas the
18Smith et al. (2009) draw on Ricoeur’s (1970) distinction between two
opposed interpretative positions: the hermeneutics of empathy and the
hermeneutics of suspicion. Whereas the first attempts to reconstruct the orig-
inal experience in its own terms, the latter is based on theoretical perspectives
form the outside for understanding the phenomenon. Smith et al. (2009)
therefore argue for a center-ground position that combines the two.
19What Smith et al. (2009) call “a reading from within” was already mentioned
by Blankenburg (1980) as “immanent interpretation.” (p. 67)
focus on “spoken speech” may seem to embrace the Cartesian
reduction of the body to a lifeless object/matter (i.e., Husserl’s
Körper), Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology aims at understand-
ing the embodied language rather than the abstract and de-
contextualized text: body and language are intertwined and
inseparable. The participant’s text is always embedded in the
lived experience, its original context(s), and in the context of the
intersubjective interview itself.
In most qualitative methods for analyzing interviews (IPA
included) the “speaking speech” is often accounted for through
the use of meticulous and accurate transcription procedures,
which typically include taking notes on the participant’s most
evident para- and non-verbal behaviors (e.g., pauses, smiles,
and crying) during the interview by inserting them into square
brackets and, where relevant, commenting shortly on the episode.
This practice has been criticized for failing to grasp the full
embodied and intersubjective experience as situated:
It remains a (formalized, methodologically constrained) way of
translating embodied experience into language: as such, it is just
as likely to omit something of its ineffable quality as any other
such attempt (…) it leaves the gulf between language and embod-
ied experience intact whilst nevertheless giving the superficial
appearance of bridging it. In this instance, then, it can appear
as though embodiment has been addressed through the technical
accumulation and management of detail (Brown et al., 2011,
p. 499).
Brown et al. (2011) suggest that rather than seeking the
solution in transcription techniques, the methodological issue
of the body needs to be addressed differently. In this regard,
in our opinion it is worth noticing a particular technique often
implemented in qualitative methods: the recollection of interview
(otherwise also referred to as diary of interview or research jour-
nal). The recollection of interview is the first stage of IPA, where
the researcher writes down all his or her immediate impressions,
feelings, thoughts that arose in the embodied encounter of the
interview situation. If then integrated in the analysis process20, the
recollection of interview may be seen as a better way to account for
the “speaking speech” as well for the intersubjective context of the
participant’s words.
Interesting alternative ways of analyzing lived experience in its
full complexity (and not just as straightforward description of
experience) may be found in attempts to look not only at the
content level of what is narrated but also at the way contents
are talked about in the situated interaction. For instance, Lysaker
et al. (2002, 2003, 2005) put a particular focus on aspects like the
coherence and quality of narratives for understanding patients’
experience. Similarly, Seikkula et al. (2011) focused on the dialogi-
cal quality of therapeutic conversations for investigating the expe-
rience of change. A further remarkable example of this research
strand is put forward by Ugazio et al. (2009, in press): in their
analyses of therapeutic conversations they not only looked at the
20Although an integration of the recollection of interview in the analysis
process is coherent with the IPA guidelines, this technique is not always
implemented. In fact, because the IPA guidelines are quite flexible, many
methodological decisions are left to the researcher’s judgment.
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“narrated” meanings but also at the “narrating” and “interactive”
levels, which refer to the more implicit, embodied and interactive
dimensions.
Other methods have tried to include the embodied aspect
of communication in the analysis process, as for instance the
PRISMA method (Pieper and Clénin, 2010): a video-supported
analysis method that uses the sensations, emotions, and thoughts
of the researchers as tools for understanding.
Although some steps have been already made in this direction,
the “methodological problem of the body” in understanding the
other’s experience seems to be still an open issue that needs to
be accounted for, especially in regards to methodologies coherent
with a second-person approach.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have critically reviewed the main theories at
the heart of the social cognition debate: looking into the core
principles of the third-, first-, and second-person approaches,
we have highlighted the implications and limitations of each
theoretical stance. Moreover, we have outlined how the second-
person perspective addresses and tries to solve different problems
related to third- and first-person theories of social cognition.
Following the different contributions to this debate we have also
stressed how, even within a second-person proposal, some issues
still remain controversial; indeed, the second-person approach
does not yet provide a definitive answer to the dilemma of
social understanding, but in our opinion it represents the most
convincing account of social cognition put forward so far within
this field.
We followed Reddy (2008) in maintaining that the problem of
understanding others constitutes the core methodological issue of
psychology research and that therefore the theoretical frameworks
accounting for this problem should inform the very process of
research in its methodological concerns: we do try to understand
others when doing research in psychology. Thus, we decided
to focus this paper on psychopathology research, making it a
paradigmatic case of this methodological issue.
Accordingly, linking social cognition theories with research
methods based on similar assumptions, we underscored how the
shortcomings and implications of each theoretical stance could
be also viewed as methodological problems in psychopathology
research. Once the epistemological and theoretical frame are
recognized and explicated, third- and first-person methods can
be criticized according to the same arguments that deconstructed
these perspectives in the social cognition debate: i.e., mainly, the
assumption that, for understanding others, the researcher starts
from an observational stance, which is detached and independent
from the object of study; that this stance is in the first place
observational and that therefore processes of understanding occur
within the observer (denying the primary and founding role of
the interaction in meaning making); that the primary processes
of understanding are already based on theorization and inference,
leaving out the immediate embodied level of engagement and
direct perception (instead of emerging from the dynamic intersec-
tion between both levels); and (for a first-person approach) that
social understanding is based on my own individual experience,
in analogy with the other’s, but disconnected.
By discussing and challenging these assumptions, we outlined
what we consider to be the core principles of the second-person
approach, drawing on the different contributions that constitute
it: i.e., mainly, the recognition of embodied and more direct
processes of social understanding as primary (and therefore the
importance of non-conative empathy and engagement for under-
standing); the assumption that our everyday stance toward others
is not observational but interactive; the importance of the social
interaction process as constitutive for social understanding; the
fundamental personalistic attitude we assume toward others as
soon as we recognize them in their difference and we acknowledge
them as responsive others (an attitude that is here seen as a
pre-condition for social understanding). Besides, we support the
claim that the intersubjective matrix of social understanding does
not simply draw on the implicit immediate level of interaction
but also on higher and reflective intertwined levels of meaning,
that are therefore seen as unfolding in the form of a hermeneutic
circle.
Finally, we looked into how second personal theories of social
understanding can inform the epistemology and methodology
of psychopathology research, by reviewing research principles,
techniques, and methods that are coherent with this perspective.
We do believe that a second-person perspective is the most
convincing methodological framework so far put forward for
psychopathology research as it best accounts for the validity of
our claims about the other.
The aim of this paper though, is not to defend one particular
research approach against another, but rather to point out the
different theoretical and epistemological assumptions supporting
each methodological stance; therefore we critically discussed the
limits and implications of different research methods. Although
an integration of different techniques is needed and useful in
research, and even first- and third-person methods should not
be totally rejected, the problem of methodological pluralism
centers on how to integrate methods in a complementary and
meaningful way, so that we can preserve the validity of our final
claims.
First of all, we believe that, in order to integrate different meth-
ods properly, a stronger critical awareness of their epistemological
underpinnings, and their different targets and limits is needed.
The reflections and discussions outlined in this paper are aimed
at drawing the attention to this important issue, to enhance this
awareness, or at least to offer some inputs for further debate.
Secondly, if we are to avoid a view of methodological pluralism
as a clash of (sometimes even contradictory) methods, research
in psychopathology should be conceived within a broader theo-
retical framework addressing the problem of how we get to know
others in the first place.
For instance, Reddy, 2008 maintained for a second-person
approach:
Disengagement is not only inevitable, it provides a valuable
dimension to knowledge that is born within engagement. Buber,
comparing the intense intimacy of the I-Thou way of knowing
with the I-it way, pointed out (albeit poetically) the inevitability
of the latter: genuine engagement for him was a time-limited
phenomenon. (…) But this is not detachment; it is disengagement
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born within and alternating with, engagement. What psychologi-
cal science need is a balance—engagement first and disengagement
second—between the two. (pp. 34–35)
Similarly, according to a second personal framework, we can
argue for the need to integrate quantitative methods (third-
person stance)21 with qualitative ones (first- or second-person
stance) in psychopathology research; but, for this integration, the
validity of the results should rely on the latter, rather than on an
illusory objectivity of the first; as Reddy wrote for a second-person
perspective, engagement comes first.
In this regard, we believe that a second-person framework
should always inform psychopathology research, as in the end we
can only know others intersubjectively, from the more embod-
ied levels of participatory sense making in the here and now
encounter, to the hermeneutic circles of interpretation where
different contextual levels of meaning come into play.
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